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In this paper, we reconsider the debate on Weitzman's (1998) suggestion to discount the long-
run future at the lowest possible rate, referring to Gollier (2004) and Hepburn & Groom 
(2007). We show that, while Weitzman's use of the present value approach may indeed seem 
questionable, its outcome, i.e. a discount rate that is declining over time, is nevertheless 
reasonable, since it can be justified by assuming a plausible degree of risk aversion. 
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July 14, 2008 1 Introduction
In a famous paper Weitzman (1998) has suggested that the lowest possible discount
rate should be used for the long￿distant future if discount rates are risky and the
social planner is risk neutral. Gollier (2004) has challenged this view recommend-
ing instead the highest possible discount rate. At ￿rst sight, both positions are
equally appealing and conform to two familiar approaches to intertemporal evalua-
tion, i.e. to the present value (PV) approach (Weitzman) and to the future value
(FV) approach (Gollier). But applying both approaches to cost￿bene￿t￿analysis
yields results that are radically di￿erent. In particular, the time path of discount
rates is declining when the PV method is used but increasing with the FV method.
So there is a puzzle or even a paradox which has to be solved. Gollier (2004) himself
has attributed the divergence between PV and FV to di￿erences in intertemporal
risk sharing whereas Hepburn & Groom (2007) have provided an explanation that
refers to di￿erences in the evaluation date. Here we ￿rst show that both attempts to
explain the puzzle can be combined and traced back to the same cause: If produc-
tivity is risky the outcome of intertemporal evaluation crucially hinges on the point
in time for which a safe payment is assumed and, while so, serves as the point of
reference. Our argument, however, should not only give some better understanding
of the Weitzman￿Gollier puzzle but should also be helpful for a general assessment
of Weitzman’s and Gollier’s approaches. It will be our conclusion that ￿ from a con-
ceptual perspective ￿ Gollier is more right than Weitzman because the PV method
is not sensible in the case of risk. But invoking the additional assumption that the
social planner is su￿ciently risk averse, it becomes possible to derive Weitzman’s
pattern of declining certainty￿equivalent interest rates by making use of the more
reasonable FV method. In this way, both approaches can be reconciled, and a new
justi￿cation for Weitzman’s discounting device is found.
2 Comparing the FV and PV approach in case of
Gollier Projects
Let us consider a two period model and a ￿Gollier project￿: Any Euro that is invested
in period t = 1 gives, with the same probability  = 0:5, either a return Rb = 0 (in
the ’bad’ case) or Rg = M  1 (in the ’good’ case) in period 2 where M  1. So the
marginal rates of transformation (￿productivities￿) between consumption in period
1 and period 2 are 1 (or, synonymously, for generation 1 and generation 2) or M,




(1 + M) (1)
as the expected value of payo￿s in period 2. A risk neutral planner then prefers a
sure project with the safe rate of return RS to the given risky project if and only if
RS > RF with RF = MF   1. This corresponds to Gollier’s FV approach.
Alternatively, one could ask which investment in period 1 would yield an expected
return of 1 in period 2. With probability 0:5 (in the ’bad’ case), this investment has
1to be 1 Euro, with the same probability (in the ’good’ case) it only has to be 1
M Euro.






is required. Then the corresponding










which re￿ects Weitzman’s PV approach.
For all M > 1 we have MF > MP.1 Thus MF and MP do not coincide and have
di￿erent implications for intertemporal evaluation. With the PV method it is more
likely that a sure project is deemed as superior to the given risky Gollier project





MP = 2. So MF is growing much stronger in M than MP and, with M
going to in￿nity, the di￿erence between MF and MP becomes in￿nitely large.
The divergence between the FV and the PV method can be explained in the
following way: Assume again that 1 Euro is invested in a Gollier project. Now
according to Weitzman’s PV approach we determine the investment which makes
sure that the payo￿ MF = 1
2 (1 + M) is realized in any case for generation 2. To
this end, a sum of 1
2 (1 + M) must be invested in the bad case with zero return
by generation 1. This ’bad case investment’ on its own already contributes 1
2 
1
2 (1 + M) = 1
4 (1 + M) to the average value of the overall investment. We have
1
4 (1 + M) > 1 if M > 3. Then the expected value of the whole investment in period









, clearly exceeds 1 Euro, too. The intuition of
this explanation is that a large M drives the expected future value of the Gollier
project so high that more than the original 1 Euro is on average needed in period 1
to provide su￿cient hedging for generation 2.
Let us now consider the standard situation in which productivity grows expo-
nentially with some constant rate r > 0 as a special case. Then we have M(t) = ert
where t is a continuous time parameter and M(t) is the discount factor at time t.
The divergence between the implied expected values MF(t) and MP(t) has much
e￿ect on the development of the two certainty￿equivalent discount rates rF(t) and
rP(t), that are de￿ned by
e















A short calculation shows that rF(t) is increasing and rP(t) is decreasing in t. This
result also holds in a far more general setting and clearly re￿ects the divergent
patterns of MF(t) and MP(t).
1This follows from







For a more general treatment see Appendix A1.
23 Interpreting Gollier’s and Hepburn & Groom’s
explanations
Gollier’s own attempt at solving the puzzle refers to the di￿erent allocation of risk
that is implied by each the FV and the PV method. With FV it is the future period
that bears all the risk whereas with PV the risk completely falls upon the present pe-
riod. From this perspective, both cases look completely symmetric, which, however,
is not in accordance with the conditions that apply in reality. As in our explanation,
Gollier (2004, p. 88) supposes in the FV case, that the ￿current generation has a
￿xed budget for investing for the future.￿ The di￿culty, however, is that in the PV
case there is no complete analogy for that. If productivity is uncertain when the
investment decision is made, actually there is no chance to move the risk to period
1. Asymmetry of time inevitably entails asymmetry of risk￿bearing. In our model,
in which a strictly positive return only occurs with probability 0:5, 1 Euro has to
be invested de￿nitely to guarantee 1 Euro as a sure payo￿ in period 2.
The asymmetry of time also shows up in Hepburn & Groom’s (2007) alterna-
tive explanation in which di￿erent dates for intertemporal evaluation are the crucial
element. In order to reformulate their argument in our framework, let, as above,
M(t) be an increasing function that describes how the marginal rate of transfor-
mation MRT between a payo￿ at time 0 and a payo￿ at some time t depends on
the continuous time parameter t. M(t) is de￿ned on the ￿nite interval [0;T] with
M(0) = 1 and M(T) = M. Assuming complete interchangeability of payo￿s along
this MRT￿curve the marginal rate of transformation between some arbitrary points
in time  and t out of [0;T] is
M(t)
M(), where ￿ this is the essential point ￿ not only
t >  but also  > t is possible. This means that foregoing a payo￿ of 1 Euro at time
 changes the payo￿ by
M(t)
M() at point t. Adopting quite formally the FV approach










If M(t) is increasing, MF(;t) is increasing in t but decreasing in  as, letting  = 0
and t = T then (5) is the expected future value of payo￿s as described by (1) (see
Hepburn & Groom (2007)). Conversely, if  = T and t = 0 equation (5) gives the
expected present value as in (2). To motivate the evaluation approach, a safe payo￿
is implicitly assumed as a target at evaluation date , which indicates the similarity
of Gollier’s and Hepburn & Groom’s approaches (see Hepburn & Groom (2007),
especially p. 102).
Even though investment in its literal sense goes from the present to the future,
the two cases,  = 0 and  = T, nevertheless are equally plausible when productiv-
ity is certain. If the payo￿ accruing in the future is reduced and the payo￿ in the
current period is increased in return, this can well be interpreted as an investment
of the future in favor of the present and further elucidates why the FV￿ and the
PV approach are equivalent in this case. In the case of productivity risk this sym-
metry breaks down: If the payo￿ in the future is to be increased by 1 Euro with
3certainty this would mean di￿erentiation of the payo￿s in the present before uncer-
tainty is resolved. Neither does this ￿t precisely to the two￿period￿model 2 nor is it
feasible for real￿world decisions on intergenerational allocation. Applying the PV
method to risky situations is tantamount to making a consideration in retrospect
and corresponds to a purely hypothetical decision.
4 Why the FV approach is warranted and how it
may produce Weitzman’s results
Both Gollier (2004) and Hepburn & Groom (2007) take a relativistic position: the
safe payo￿ or the vantage point for the intertemporal evaluation can in principle
lie everywhere on the time axis. Our considerations, however, have shown that
￿ because time and risk go in only one direction ￿ it is not very useful to adopt
a reference point in the future. So in contrast to Gollier’s own assertion neither
Weitzman nor he himself are both wrong. Rather much more is in favor of Gollier’s
approach because he puts the risk to the right place, i.e. to the future period. By
applying the PV method to situations with productivity risk, Weitzman implicitly
seeks to avoid risks for the future period and thus gives the future generation some
claim to a safe payo￿. This privileged position of the future is clearly re￿ected in his
main result, i.e. in the convergence of the certainty equivalent to the lowest possible
value.3
If we are interested in the well￿being of posterity it is the inevitably uncertain
future value of income or utility that has to count. Concerning decisions on inter-
generational risk sharing, we are in Gollier’s world ￿ like it or not. In the framework
of expected utility theory the obvious way to give our descendants more protection
is to explicitly introduce some risk aversion. With risk neutrality and Weitzman’s
PV approach future￿friendliness only comes indirectly and has no solid conceptual
foundation.
Allowing for risk aversion, the picture changes considerably. Consider the famil-
iar class of isoelastic von Neumann￿Morgenstern utility functions which are ￿ for




1  for   0,  6= 1
lnx for  = 1
(6)
where x is the payo￿ level. Again let M(t) = ert where r is the exogenously given
discount rate. Then, with the FV approach, in our simple model the certainty
2So both Gollier (2004) and Hepburn & Groom (2007) assume that uncertainty is resolved
and the true rate of return becomes known before the investment decision is really made. This
corresponds to a three stage model which, however, is not made explicit. Hence, it remains unclear
what is meant by risk￿bearing in the present.
3The PV method would only make sense, if the risky project could be repeated very often with
uncorrelated risk. Then, with some given target payo￿ for the future periods, a mixed strategy
could be played at each earlier stage in a chain of risky projects. Then also the ￿present￿ could
bear some risk, and the ￿future￿ would on average ￿nish with the desired payo￿. Such a repetition
clearly is not feasible with global risks, such as climate change.
4equivalent discount rates r












for any point of time t > 0. For  = 0 we are in the case of risk neutrality.
Then, clearly, r0
F(t) = rF(t), i.e. the interest rates derived from (7) coincide with
those in the Gollier approach. If, however,  = 2 we have r2
F(t) = rP(t), i.e. the
same discount rates as with Weitzman’s PV approach. So Gollier’s more sensible
conceptual basis can be used to justify Weitzman’s solution.





rF ((1   )t) for  < 1
rP ((   1)t) for  > 1
(8)
results, which, as a general result, is demonstrated in Appendix A2. Hence, as
in Gollier’s approach, the function r

F(t) is increasing in t if inequality aversion
expressed by  is rather low, whereas it is ￿ as in Weitzman’s conception ￿ decreasing
if  exceeds 1. With  = 1 we get r1
F(t) = r
2, i.e. a constant discount rate.
Since   1 seems to be the more adequate assumption, which is con￿rmed by
experimental studies and regularly invoked in climate change analysis, decreasing
discount rates are obtained. In Weitzman’s critique of the Stern Review the value
 = 2 is even explicitly suggested as part of a ￿trio of twos￿ (see Weitzman (2007),
p. 707).4 This con￿rms Weitzman’s result even by using Gollier’s approach based
on future expected values.
5 Conclusion
Weitzman’s (1998) postulate to discount bene￿t and costs that accrue in the long￿
distant future at the lowest imaginable discount rate has not found unanimous con-
sent. Our analysis has provided a twofold assessment of this debate: On the one
hand, the objections raised by Gollier (2004) seem to be justi￿ed insofar as they
are directed against the use of Weitzman’s present value approach in the case of
uncertainty. So Weitzman’s approach would imply full risk￿bearing by the present
generation which ￿ as has been shown in this paper ￿ is impossible because of the
asymmetry of time. On the other hand, the result obtained by Weitzman never-
theless seems to be appropriate for long￿run decisions, since introducing a plausible
degree of risk aversion into Gollier’s approach can produce the same pattern of
declining interest rates as suggested by Weitzman.
4In the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (Stern (2006)) a value of  = 1
is used. Other economists as Arrow (2007) also recommend the use of higher ￿values. A range
for sensible ￿values betweem 1 and 2 has been derived axiomatically by Buchholz & Schumacher
(2008). For empirical estimates on real￿world ￿values see e.g. Evans (2005) and Pirttilae &
Uusitalo (2007).
5Appendix A1
Let ~ M be a random variable which takes on values in an interval [M;M] where
M > 0 and M < 1. As a generalization of (3) and (4) we de￿ne
MF = E ~ M (9)
and
MP = E ~ M
 1: (10)
Then, using the Cauchy￿Schwarz inequality we obtain
MF
MP
= E ~ M  E ~ M
 1  E( ~ M
1
2)















which gives the assertion.
Appendix A2
Let, as in Hepburn & Groom (2007), ~ r be a random variable which takes value in
an interval [r;r] where r  0 and r < 1. Quite analogously to (3) and (4) certainty








for any point in time t > 0.



























which proves the assertion in this case. For  > 1 the proof is quite analogous.
Finally, for  = 1 we have
lne
r1





F(t) = E ~ r = const. (18)
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